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Cognitive Enhancement and Anthropotechnological Change: Towards an Organology and 
Pharmacology of Cognitive Enhancement Technologies 
 
Pieter Lemmens 
 
Abstract: This article focuses on cognitive enhancement technologies (CET) and their possible 
anthropological implications, and argues for a reconsideration of the human-technology relation so 
as to be able to better understand and assess these implications. Current debates on cognitive 
enhancement (CE) often start from an instrumental and anthropocentric view of technology and a 
(neo-)Darwinist account of the human, consistently disregarding the intimate intertwinement of the 
human and technology as well as the fundamentally technogenic nature of the process of 
anthropogenesis. Yet, an adequate assessment of CET requires an in-depth and up-to-date 
conceptualization of the human-technology relationship as well as the technogenesis of the 
anthropos. Employing Bernard Stiegler’s recently devised philosophico-anthropological 
framework of general organology as well as his theory of technology as a pharmakon, this article 
proposes to develop an organology and pharmacology of cognitive enhancement. What is typical 
about new cognitive enhancement technologies is their interiorizing (instead of the traditionally 
exteriorizing) nature, which can be expected to totally reshape current organological 
configurations. Starting from the premise that CE is a phenomenon that should be understood 
fundamentally from its unfolding within the current conjuncture of cognitive capitalism, I will 
present the issue of cognitive proletarianization as being of crucial importance for considering CE. 
I conclude by providing some methodological guidelines for the development of a positive 
pharmacology of CET, focused on deproletarianization and specifically related to the improvement 
of attention, suggesting that CET should be considered in this respect as technologies of the self à 
la Michel Foucault. 
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Introduction 
The relationship between humans and techno-science is expected to change dramatically in the 
coming decades, most particularly because of the emergence of a whole spectrum of new 
technologies that, in contrast to technological developments until recently, will not so much alter 
the environment in which humans live as, instead, intervene in the human itself, i.e., into his body 
and mind. In the wake of the growing interest within academia of the ideas and utopic projections 
of so-called ‘transhumanist’ and ‘extropian’ thinkers like Nick Bostrom, Anders Sandberg, Julian 
Savulescu, Max More, John Harris, Simon Young and many others, a debate has risen in recent 
years about the idea of human enhancement (HE), i.e., about the possibilities, the prospects and the 
risks of improving the human through the application of science and technology, in particular 
through the use of the so-called NBIC technologies1, which carry the promise – apparently – of 
enabling the substantial improvement of ‘human performance’ (Roco and Bainbridge 2003). 
 However you look at human enhancement technologies (HET), they will certainly have 
huge consequences for the way the human-technology relationship will evolve in the future. This 
means that we have to seriously reconsider the intersection between technology and anthropology, 
emphasizing the technicity of the anthropos and the anthropologos. Techno-Anthropology is an 
emerging discipline that proposes to deal with questions concerning the changing intersections 
between technology and anthropology. This article aims to contribute to this discipline through an 
exploration of the original technicity of the anthropos in view of developing a methodology for 
studying and critically assessing – in particular ‘intimate’ – human-technology interactions. This 
methodology, termed practical organology, will be developed from a Stieglerian perspective on the 
original technicity of the anthropos. 
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 One of the most promising, and in any case, most exciting areas of HE is cognitive 
enhancement (CE): the improvement of the cognitive capacities of the human mind(-body).2 This 
has become a highly controversial field since emerging waves of new technologies are bound to 
have huge impacts on both the individual and the societal level. Notably, it is claimed that those 
technologies have the potential to fundamentally change our cognitive system or even ‘human 
nature’ itself, opening up a ‘trans-human’ or ‘posthuman’ future (More and Vita-More 2013). 
Ethical and societal debates range from issues such as risks, benefits, and safety to questions about 
autonomy, agency, identity, and the possibility or desirability of ‘reshaping’ human nature 
(Savulescu and Bostrom 2009). 
 Until now, the ethical and political debate on CE has been largely informed by theoretical 
approaches building on neoliberalism, utilitarianism, and analytic philosophy (cf. Bostrom and 
Roach 2008). These approaches most often rely on a neurocentric and (neo-) Darwinist account of 
human cognition, consistently disregarding, as I argue in this article, the intimate intertwinement 
of the human and technology and the fundamentally technogenic nature of the process of 
anthropogenesis (of which the genesis of the human cognitive apparatus is undoubtedly the most 
remarkable aspect). Yet, an adequate assessment of cognitive enhancement technologies (CET) 
and their effects upon human cognition requires an in-depth and up-to-date conceptualization of 
the human-technology relationship, one that should be based, I uphold, on a profound 
understanding of the fundamental technicity as well as the technogenic origin of the human 
cognitive system, i.e., the fact that it is deeply constituted and conditioned by, as well as evolved 
in intimate interaction with, technology. In the current debate, this anthropotechnological 
dimension is underdeveloped if not totally absent. 
 In my research I aim to contribute to exploring this dimension. In this contribution, 
however, I have to limit myself necessarily to providing only some building blocks for a yet to be 
developed anthropotechnological framework that could guide the ethical and political debate on 
CE. After a brief review of the dominant, neurocentric and (neo)Darwinist account of human 
cognition figuring prominently in the current debate, I will employ Bernard Stiegler’s recently 
developed theory of ‘general organology’ to propose an organology of cognition in which the brain 
as the central cognitive organ is theorized explicitly in its intimate relationship with both the 
technical organs with which it continuously interacts and with the social organizations in which it 
is always embedded. Within this organological framework -- and this is important for considering 
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the issue of enhancement -- the technical organs are conceived by Stiegler as having the character 
of pharmaka, i.e., as being both poisoning and remedying in the sense of simultaneously possessing 
both the ability of supporting and of undermining, in our case, cognitive capacities (because, as I 
will show, they fundamentally compensate for an ‘ontological lack’). Starting from the premise 
that CE is a phenomenon that should be understood fundamentally from a politico-economic 
perspective, in particular as a project that unfolds within the current conjuncture of cognitive 
capitalism, I will then, from both an organological and a pharmacological perspective, present the 
issue of (cognitive) proletarianization as being of crucial importance for considering CE, both in 
their particular forms and in a general sense. I will conclude this article by providing some 
methodological guidelines for the development of a positive pharmacology of CET, focused on 
deproletarianization and specifically related to the improvement of attention, suggesting that CET 
should be considered in this respect as technologies of the self in the sense of Michel Foucault. 
 
The Neurocentric and (Neo-)Darwinist View of Human Cognition 
Remarkably, given their focus on the technological ‘upgrading’ of the human cognitive apparatus, 
most contenders within the current debate on CE share a neurocentric and (neo-)Darwinist view of 
human cognition that is derived from the contemporary cognitive and neurosciences. This is a view 
that consistently disregards the role of technology in human cognitive processes (Bostrom and 
Sandberg 2009; Buchanan 2011)3. 
 Most if not all of today’s cognitive science is decidedly neurocentric, and this is of course 
especially true of the cognitive neurosciences. The brain is invariably understood as a self-
sufficient cognitive engine, as the exclusive seat of cognition. What the Marxist historian of science 
John D. Bernal already stated in 1929 is still common belief in today’s neurosciences: “After all it 
is the brain that counts, and to have a brain suffused by fresh and correctly prescribed blood is to 
be alive - to think” (Bernal 2010, 31). Since cognitive science’s ‘turn to the brain’ in the eighties, 
which was largely a consequence from the development of new imaging technologies for studying 
the brain, “most cognitive scientists place the study of the brain firmly at the heart of cognitive 
science” (Bermúdez 2010, 93) and “are convinced that in some fundamental sense the mind just is 
the brain, so that everything that happens in the mind is happening in the brain” (Bermúdez 2010, 
6). According to Patricia Churchland, a leading contemporary philosopher of mind and cognition, 
“Mental activity is brain activity” (2002, 30).4 Another well-known philosopher of mind, John 
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Searle, asserts, referring to the famous ‘brain in a vat’ thought experiment popular among analytic 
philosophers of mind: 
 
The brain is all we have for the purpose of representing the world to ourselves and 
everything we can use must be in the brain. Each of our beliefs must be possible for a 
being who is a brain in a vat because each of us is precisely a brain in a vat; the vat is 
the skull and the “messages” coming in are coming in by way of impacts on the nervous 
system. (Searle 1983, 230) 
 
And as Daniel Dennett writes in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: “Of course our minds are our brains, 
and hence are ultimately just stupendously complex “machines”; the difference between us and 
animals is one of degree, not metaphysical kind” (1995, 370). 
 More recently, prominent MIT philosopher of cognitive science Paul Thagard claims that 
“we should identify minds with brains” (2010, 9) since, he argues, “human thought is accomplished 
by the human brain” (2005, 18) and therefore “the mind is what the brain does” (2010, 42). Feelings 
such as hope but also modes of perceiving and reasoning are just brain processes, according to 
Thagard, and even concepts themselves are to be understood as “neural processes rather than ideal 
entities” (2010, 36), he confidently claims, apparently unaware of Husserl’s refutation of such 
categorical naturalistic misunderstandings. As for the Darwinistic convictions of Thagard, shared 
by most of his colleagues, he asserts his agreement with Darwin that “humans are just another 
biological species evolved through natural selection” and reminds us that ”our treasured thoughts 
and feelings are just another biological process” (2010, 42). Many more authors could be cited 
here, but it should be clear that the view that seems overwhelmingly dominant in today’s cognitive 
science is that cognition is “BRAINBOUND,” as the British philosopher of cognition Andy Clark 
puts it (Clark 2011, xxvii). And the consensus among cognitive scientists, philosophers of 
cognition, and most proponents as well as opponents of CE is that this brain is a product of 
Darwinian evolution, i.e., evolution via natural selection. 
 Although it is increasingly criticized both from within and outside the cognitive (and also 
the brain) sciences themselves (Legrenzi and Umiltà 2011; Tallis 2011), the neurocentric view on 
cognition is still the dominant one by far. Even more so, the brain is popularly (as well as 
professionally) perceived nowadays as containing the key to understanding almost every aspect of 
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human life, just as the genome seemed to be a decade ago. Thus the neurosciences have become 
the most revered (and lavishly funded) sciences in recent times and the prefix ‘neuro-‘ is attached 
to almost every thinkable discipline and practice (from neuro-ethics and neuro-theology to neuro-
marketing and neuro-capitalism). A person’s self-understanding is also becoming more and more 
“brain-based,” as Nikolas Rose has argued, coining the term ‘neurochemical self’ for the emerging 
view human subjects have of themselves (2007, 188). Over the last decade, science as well as 
society at large have come into the grip of a “neuromolecular gaze” (Rose and Abi-Rached 2013, 
4)5. 
 In this article, it will be emphasized that it is the crucial role of technical artifacts that is 
especially and consistently neglected within the cognitive sciences and the CE project embracing 
the view of these sciences. Cognition is not simply what occurs in the brains of individuals. It also 
resides in the relations between individuals and particularly in the technical artifact that makes the 
relations between the bodies and minds of these individuals possible. What is becoming ever more 
clear, not in the least because of the discovery of so-called neural plasticity (more on this in sections 
3 and 5), is that the technical environment is just as important for understanding human cognition 
as are the neural processes in the brain (Stiegler 2008a, 26-7) because the brain is continuously 
changing through its interaction with this environment.6 
 
The Organology and Pharmacology of Human Cognition 
Human cognition cannot be conceived in terms of an individual faculty localized in the brain. 
Instead, it is a fundamentally social phenomenon, the product of social organizations, which are 
themselves thoroughly conditioned by technical systems through which individual brains (or 
psyches) interact with each other and articulate themselves (Stiegler 2010b, 34). The brain, and 
this is fundamental to Stiegler’s technological and technogenic conception of human cognition, is 
only one of the three elements that constitute the phenomenon of human cognition as a whole. 
 What most of today’s theories of human cognition behind the speculations about the 
prospects of CE tend to overlook is the technogenic origin of human cognition. Such a proposition 
posits that human knowledge is technological in essence and that the human cognitive apparatus is 
characterized by what Stiegler calls ‘original technicity.’7 Human cognition essentially depends on 
technical artifacts, i.e., the human cognitive apparatus exists only in an intimate relationship with 
its artificial memory supports and its cognitive operativity is constituted by the very material 
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characteristics of these supports as organized inorganic objects (Stiegler 2009a, 164). The use of 
prostheses to enhance human cognition is not at all a recent phenomenon. On the contrary, human 
cognition is originally prosthetic. What defines the human cognitive apparatus in comparison to 
that of other animals is the fact that it does not consist of a neural system only, but of a neural 
system deeply intertwined with a technical system. That is to say: it must be understood 
fundamentally as an original coupling of brain and prostheses, i.e., as composed of a neuronal 
structure intrinsically connected with a system of technical artifacts. What is crucial to apprehend 
here is that this coupling – the intimate relationship of the brain and its prostheses - is “older” (i.e., 
more original) than either the human brain or ‘its’ technical supports themselves (Stiegler 2009a, 
164). 
 Stiegler understands ‘the human’ principally as a process, that is to say as a process of 
individuation in which three organ systems continuously evolve in intimate interaction with each 
other: (1) the biological organs, of which the brain as the seat of the psyche is most important, (2) 
the social organs or organizations, like schools, tribes, nations, companies, etc., and (3) the 
technical organs, like stone tools, writing techniques, automobiles and computers (always 
constituting a technical system) (Stiegler 2013, 419-20).8 The metastable equilibria constantly 
produced in the configurations between these three organ systems are what drives the human 
process of individuation, which must be understood as a threefold dynamic of psychic, social and 
technical co-individuation. The relationship between these three organ systems is of a transductive 
nature, meaning that the relata do not exist apart from their relationship with each other but 
continuously co-constitute themselves reciprocally in the process (Stiegler 2010a, 104).9
 Cognition, then, must also be understood as a process of psychic, social and technical co-
individuation, a process that is principally open and interminable, never ‘complete’ but always ‘in 
coming.’ Although it is impossible to attribute some sort of causal primacy to any of the three organ 
systems, since we are dealing with metastable equilibria, Stiegler nevertheless contends that this 
individuation process is ‘driven’ in the final analysis by the evolution of the technical organs, i.e., 
by the dynamic of technical individuation. This is so because, as Stiegler shows through the work 
of the French paleoanthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan, the human being has evolved from a 
process of technical exteriorization. The human is the effect of an evolutionary process based not 
so much on biological transmission via genes as on the extra-biological transmission of technical 
artifacts embodying exteriorized (and materialized) individual experiences (Stiegler 2004, 46). 
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Homo sapiens is not so much a product of bio-evolution, as (neo)Darwinists maintain, but of 
techno-evolution, and this is particularly true of the human cognitive apparatus.10 
 Organologically, over the course of human evolution and subsequently of human history, 
the constant appropriation or adoption of new technical organs by individuals involves the periodic 
de- and re-functionalization of their cognitive apparatuses, i.e., their brains (as it does the de- and 
re-organization of the social organs). The brain as the principal organ of human individuation, and 
as the organ of fabrication and use of technical objects, is and has always been in a transductive 
relation to its technical objects, and more encompassingly, to the technical milieu in which it is 
always already embedded. This transductive relation evolves, evolutionary and historically, 
precisely in the form of periodic re- and defunctionalizations of the human brain in response to the 
appearance of new technical organs (Stiegler 2005a, 217). It is the brain’s neural plasticity, evolved 
over the course of more than two million years of human-technology co-evolution, which forms 
the condition of possibility for these periodic cycles of organological de- and re-functionalization 
(Stiegler 2010a, 97). This neural plasticity enables the psychic organs to interiorize the abilities 
related to the possibilities that are opened up with the exteriorized artifacts, i.e., the technical organs 
(96). 
 The principal openness and interminability of the process of human individuation, its being 
structurally “without-end,” is grounded in the “fact,” according to Stiegler, that the human is a 
being without origin, a being that has a lack or fault at or as its origin (2004, 43). This thoroughly 
accidental understanding of the human being’s “de-fault of origin” (défaut d’origine) is probably 
Stiegler’s most fundamental thought and absolutely crucial to grasp in order to understand his 
conception of cognition. It is due to this de-fault of origin that the human being is – by necessity 
as it were – a technical being, a being whose ‘ontological’ structure is technologically, i.e., 
accidentally constituted, changing all the time. Because of their lack of intrinsic qualities, humans 
are fundamentally in need of artificial supplements, i.e., technical prostheses. They are 
characterized by an original prostheticity (2004, 45).11 
 Fundamentally prosthetic, i.e., fundamentally in need of prostheses, the human is a being 
that finds its being outside of itself – the Greek word pros-thesis means something which stands in 
front of or outside of that which is placed in front of it (2004, 192). Humans exist only in the form 
of a lack, they exist only as lack, that is to say only by default. This means that they only ‘are’ in 
(constantly) becoming. Humans can only ‘achieve’ or ‘complete’ themselves by de-fault(s), i.e., 
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through prostheses. But this actually means, according to Stiegler, that humans can always only in-
complete themselves, in the sense of constantly ‘displacing’ that which makes them de-faulting and 
which, by putting them into movement, permits them to continue the course of their individuation. 
As Stiegler writes: “That which ‘drives’ man is his de-fault” (2005b, 82). That is to say: the de-
fault of origin is man’s ultimate motor and motif, that which drives his individuation process and 
appears as such as his very condition, and therefore as “that which should be” (ce qu’il faut), as 
Stiegler writes in a wordplay that  works only in French (2013b, 105). 
 For Stiegler, technologies as prostheses are intrinsically ambiguous in the sense that they 
can both foster and intensify or ruin and erode processes of psychic and social individuation, i.e., 
they can both support and undermine psychosocial individuation processes. Differently put: 
technologies can be conducive of both individuation and disindividuation. It is for this reason that 
he theorizes them fundamentally as pharmaka (Stiegler 2013a, 421-2). Pharmakon is a Greek word 
meaning both poison and medicine. Technologies as pharmaka can simultaneously poison 
processes of psychocollective individuation and be employed to cure these very same poisoned 
processes. The only way to cure the “poisoning” or “toxifying” effects of technological pharmaka 
is via these very same pharmaka: by developing new practices around and on the basis of these 
pharmaka, i.e., practices of care (Stiegler 2010a, 85). Whether pharmaka act as a poison or function 
as a medicine –  i.e., as a therapeutic – depends then on the presence or absence of a practice of 
care (Stiegler 2013b, 31-2, 96-7). 
 An organology of cognition, I suggest, should theorize human cognition as resulting from 
the tripartite and transductive articulation of psychic organs, technical organs and social 
organizations. Cognition thus conceived is fundamentally a process of co-individuation necessarily 
involving these three organ systems, and in which the technical organs – as pharmaka – can both 
support and subvert the cognitive individuation process. The subversion of the cognitive 
individuation process via the technical organs, which leads to disindividuation, is referred to by 
Stiegler with a notion originally derived from the Marxist tradition but interpreted more decisively 
in a Simondonian fashion, which is that of proletarianization. The danger of proletarianization, 
which belongs to the very technicity of human existence as such, is also inherent (and even more 
dangerously so) in CET. 
 
Cognitive Proletarianization: Disenhancement of Cognitive Capacity 
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Within Marxism, proletarianization is generally understood in terms of the separation between 
producers (laborers) and the means of production (technologies) as well as the exploitation of labor 
by capital enabled through capital’s ownership of the means of production and its expropriation of 
the fruits of that labor. The famous proletariat then consists of all those who are in this way 
exploited by capital (Marx and Engels 2002, 219). 
 Although this ‘juridico-economic’ aspect of expropriation and exploitation is crucial for 
Stiegler as well, the more fundamental characteristic of proletarianization for him as a thinker of 
technology, thereby following Simondon (1989, 117-8), consists in the loss of knowledge and 
know-how of the laborer – and by extension of every subject engaged in whatever sense in technical 
innovation processes, especially under capitalist conditions – to the technical organs, onto which 
this knowledge and know-how is progressively transferred (Stiegler 2011, 104). Through 
increasing delegation of tasks to technical organs, which is what happened in the course of the 
mechanization and industrialization process of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, laborers have been turned more and more into simple servants of increasingly complex 
machinery, externally designed by engineers employed by capital as well. This has led to a 
dissociation with the sociotechnical milieu, excluding the laborers from participation in the 
evolution of this milieu (Stiegler 2010b, 38). 
 From the perspective of individuation, the process of proletarianization can be described as 
an increasing disadjustment, or divorce of the processes of psychic and collective individuation 
from the process of technical individuation, causing them to disindividuate. Organologically, it 
involves the progressive dominance of the technical organs over the psychic organs and the social 
organizations, due to the fact that the technical exteriorizations of which these technical organs 
consist are not re-interiorized by the psyches and the social organizations. This happens when they 
are not properly adopted, in Stiegler’s terminology, but when psyches and social organizations are 
instead led to adapt themselves to these exteriorizations, which produces psychic and social 
heteronomy instead of (always technologically conditioned) autonomy (Stiegler 2013b, 32). 
 Proletarianization takes place when processes of psychosocial individuation are short-
circuited by processes of technical individuation. Cognitive proletarianization occurs when the 
human cognitive apparatus, as well as the social organizations involved in cognitive processing, 
are more and more superseded, and thereby short-circuited, by cognitive technologies as the 
artificial cognitive organs intended to support the processes of cognition. In replacing the psychic 
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and collective organs, however, they come to subvert them (Stiegler 2013b, 104). This actually 
entails a destruction – or at least a disenhancement – of cognitive capacity (which necessarily 
requires the ‘wholesome’ interplay of all three levels). 
 As Stiegler suggests, cognitive proletarianization is precisely what has taken place on a 
massive scale over the last three decades, in which so-called cognitive capitalism has successfully 
pursued the control of cognitive labor and its immaterial products through the networks of digital 
information technologies. A characteristic feature of the past three decades, the period of the 
digitization and informatization of society and the becoming hegemonic of what Hardt and Negri 
(2000) and other post-operaists have called immaterial labor, has been the proletarianization of 
noetic life (Stiegler 2013b, 103). 
 While the nineteenth century brought the proletarianization of the producer and the 
twentieth century has been the age of the proletarianization of the consumer (of its savoir-vivre), 
according to Stiegler, the twenty-first century is bent to become the epoch of the proletarianization 
of the intelligentsia, of engineers, scientists, and scholars, i.e., of their theoretical knowledge 
(savoir-théorique). The more the knowledge and knowhow derived from their cognitive processes 
is implemented in computer and cybernetic systems of all sorts, the more those who work with 
their minds – the “knowledge workers of the world” – are forced to adapt their cognitive activity 
to the digital systems whose instrumental parameters they have nevertheless helped to establish 
(Stiegler 2013b, 102). Moreover, they find their cognitive activity increasingly modulated and 
controlled by these systems, to the point that it tends to disappear almost entirely. Whereas 
industrial capitalism proletarianized the muscular system, today’s cognitive capitalism 
proletarianizes the nervous system, i.e., the brain as the central organ of cognition (Stiegler 2010b, 
45). 
   The bulk of today’s cognitive technologies – including explicit CET – are designed for 
the purpose of enhancing cognitive performance exclusively in terms of the speed and efficiency 
with which information is processed. Although this is not necessarily a bad thing, it becomes 
problematic when the cognitive activity of the psychic organs involved in the process is bypassed 
or short-circuited such that their ability to reflect or critique – the truly noetic i.e., ‘thinking’ 
dimension of cognition – is systematically impeded. In Stiegler’s view, this is exactly what is 
happening under the influence of cognitive capitalism, in which the cognitive has increasingly been 
reduced to its instrumental rational dimensions (to use a term from Max Weber) and reasoning has 
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turned more and more exclusively into calculating, given the fact that the criteria for selection of 
the fruits of ‘immaterial production’ have become exclusively dictated by the market, i.e., subjected 
to the arch-criterion of short-term profitability (Stiegler 2010b, 46; Stiegler 2004, 112). It is this 
capacity for reflection and critique which is particularly under threat and which does not seem to 
be the most pressing issue in current research on CET, notwithstanding the great expectations about 
superhuman intelligence of many a transhumanist author (Bostrom 2014). 
 Although hardly discussed, let alone noticed, in the mainstream debate on CE, the dominant 
use of cognitive technologies today – that is to say in the context of cognitive and consumer 
capitalism and the so-called “attention economy” – is concerned with the capture and control of 
attention and the streamlining of attentional and cognitive processes according to the needs of 
capital accumulation (increase of speed and efficiency, quantification and ‘calculabilization’ 
through informatization, etc.). This is largely achieved nowadays through the delegation of 
functions previously residing in the psychic organs to technical organs embodying artificial 
intelligence in all kinds of forms (from simple pocket calculators, electronic agendas and personal 
digital assistants to administrative systems, expert systems of all kinds and financial algorithms), 
without – and this is crucial – there being any interiorization involved that would allow the psychic 
organs to actively re-functionalize themselves and form new, more autonomous transductive 
relations with these technical organs. Such re-functionalization, according to Stiegler, is very well 
possible, on the condition of creating educational institutions that would take care of teaching the 
adoption of such technologies for attaining increased autonomy, i.e., for struggling against 
cognitive proletarianization (Stiegler 2010a, 97). 
 
Interiorization and the New Forms of Proletarianization 
As already mentioned, what uniquely characterizes the technologies commonly referred to as the 
NBIC technologies -- the technologies that are supposed to converge more and more and are 
specifically intended for improving human performance -- is that they deviate from the age-old 
evolutionary path of technical exteriorization and instead open the path of technical interiorization. 
Whereas earlier technologies were external objects surrounding us and in front of us, the new 
technologies enter inside us, fusing to a greater or lesser extent with our biological constitution. 
Information technologies more and more intersect with our nervous systems and biotechnologies 
intervene in the biomolecular and genetic mechanisms underpinning our organismic functioning. 
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Increasingly, these technologies will no longer be separable from our bodies and minds, no longer 
tools externally supporting them but mechanisms internally transforming them. We could say then 
that these new technologies are becoming ‘one’ with our organism, and this intimately affects, as 
Franco Berardi perceptively notes, the way that our bodies and minds express themselves and relate 
to the world (2011, 23). 
 What seems to be at hand with these technologies is a kind of return of the technically 
exteriorized into the human body itself, i.e., a re-entry into the biological and neurological ‘basis’ 
from which it originated, in the sense of a modification and transformation of the psychosomatic 
organs that make up one of the three organ systems in the organological configuration that 
underpins the human process of individuation. NBIC technologies allow the technological re-
arrangement and even redesign (or so it is claimed) of the biological and neurological interior. 
Instead of organizing the exterior inorganic, these technologies engage in a dis-organization and/or 
re-organization of the interior (e.g., genetic, biochemical, neural) organic. This ‘interiorizing turn’ 
of technology will, in all probability, inaugurate a new phase in the process of human individuation 
in that it will substantially transform the conditions under which this individuation will take place. 
As such, NBIC technologies can be called transformational technologies (Stiegler 2008b, 37). In 
this context the well-known figure of the cyborg – the ‘cybernetic organism’ that is a hybrid of the 
organismic and the cybernetic, of biology and technology – comes online. 
 As I would like to claim here, an analysis of the impact of cyborglike technologies – and of 
interiorizing CET more generally – on human freedom and responsibility requires an organological 
approach, the one laid out earlier above, although it needs to be adapted to be able to account for 
the specific human-technology relations emerging from technological interiorization. As Stiegler 
suggests, the ‘interiorizing turn’ of technology obliges us to completely rethink the relationship 
between freedom and technology, or in the terminology he prefers: between human autonomy and 
technical heteronomy. More precisely, it forces us to completely rethink the heteronomous, i.e., 
technical conditions of human autonomy (Stiegler 2014, 152). 
 What is more, this pharmacology needs to be carried out from the perspective of political-
economy, since enhancement is a project that crucially emerges within the context of an economic 
system: cognitive capitalism. This larger context is not addressed or seriously taken into account 
in mainstream debates on CE. In Stiegler’s analysis, however, it plays a central role: cognitive 
capitalism unfolds itself ever more decisively and indisputably as a process of generalized 
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automation in which, as Berardi writes, “human minds and flesh are integrated with digital circuits” 
(2009b, 35), and “the digital nervous system incorporates itself progressively in the organic 
nervous system, in the circuit of human communication” (36), recodifying it according to its own 
operational logic and speed. CET allow for the increased adaptation of the organic nervous system 
to the demands coming from the digital nervous system, be it through installing ‘implants’ that 
facilitate the governance and control of the former by the latter or through neurotechnological 
modification or transformation of the organic nervous system itself to make it more compatible 
with the digital nervous system. 
 What is essential to keep in mind here is that all cognitive (enhancement) technologies – as 
technologies – are essentially automatisms that in one way or the other associate with the human 
cognitive apparatus for the purpose, apparently, of enhancing cognition and improving (features 
of) the cognitive process. But as such – and being pharmaka – they can also hamper, disturb or 
undermine the process of cognition. What is new in the case of the interiorizing enhancement 
technologies as automatisms is that they enter the psychic or neural organ itself or at least couple 
with it in a very intimate way, i.e., on the neurological level, such that this organ is directly modified 
internally or transformed or at least directly ‘solicited’ and ‘played upon.’ This is wholly 
unprecedented because all cognitive (enhancement) technologies until now have been technical 
exteriorizations that were only subsequently interiorized via the indirect way of learning processes 
(skilling and education). 
 To be able to understand and critically assess, organologically, what is going on here we 
need to zoom in on the characteristics of the psychic or neural organ itself (i.e., the human brain) 
– as transductively connected to the two other organ systems – and ask the question of how the 
organological configuration and the transductive relations between the three organ systems that 
constitute this configuration change when the possibility of directly intervening in this centrally 
important organ system announces itself. The question here is what kind of dangers this possibility 
brings with it for cognition, because obviously these interventions, as pharmaka, not only enhance, 
but also ‘disenhance’ cognition. What new kinds of proletarianization are opened up with the 
emergence of the interiorizing CET that are expected to spring from the NBIC revolution? 
 To get a grip on this issue, the organological perspective suggests that the brain, over the 
course of human-technology co-evolution, has evolved into the organ in which – through 
neurogenesis or synaptogenesis – transformations in the sociotechnical milieu are translated into 
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the neural structures that constitute the material substrate of the psychic organ. This phenomenon, 
by which the human brain ‘attunes’ itself to its sociotechnical environment, is possible thanks to 
the human brain’s cerebral or neural plasticity. As Katherine Hayles (2007) writes in an article 
discussed by Stiegler on the role of new media in the formation of juvenile attention profiles  
“humans are born with a nervous system ready to be re-configured as a function of their 
environment” (cited in Stiegler 2010a, 74).12 Human brains can react, at the neuronal level, to 
changes in their technical environments, changes that result (that is to say: until now) from the 
incessant process of technical exteriorization. 
 Neural plasticity, as synaptic efficacy, can be seen in fact as a mechanism of individuation 
that makes each brain a unique object. It is a process of neural individuation underpinning what 
Stiegler theorizes as the process of psychic individuation. However, as Stiegler shows, the neural 
plasticity enabling the process of neural individuation can only adequately be understood  from the 
fact that the brain is always already implicated, as it were, in an organological configuration that 
ties it transductively to both technical organs and social organizations. Neural plasticity is that 
which allows for the constant de- and refunctionalization of the psychic organs under the influence 
of changes in the technical milieu that result from the process of technical exteriorization, 
reconfiguring social organizations. It explains/enables the interiorization of technical 
exteriorizations inducing transformations in the social organizations. 
 As such, it could be said that for Stiegler the brain is not (just) an organic (biological) organ 
but, indeed, (also) an organo-logical organ, in the sense that it – as a technicized organ supported 
and ‘moved’ by a process of technical exteriorization – is also an organ of sense and meaning, an 
organ that projects and opens onto a world (Welt) and not just, as in the case of animals, an 
environment or Umwelt, to use a term from the Estonian biologist Jacob von Uexküll. And only as 
an organological organ, in its transductive relationship with technical organs and social 
organization, can it be a noetic organ, an organ of knowledge and cognition in the human sense. 
The neurocentric conception of cognition affirmed by contemporary cognitive and neurosciences 
cannot, therefore, account for the noetic nature of the human brain. It can only address its (sub-
noetic) animalistic functionalities. 
 Neural plasticity means that the brain can be ‘programmed’ by technical organs. In fact, the 
adoption of technical exteriorizations and the acquisition of new capacities and attentional modes 
based on it (as the process of interiorization) occurs through the reorganization of neural circuitry 
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(as ‘engrammation’), which enables the refunctionalization of the psychic organ. In this way, brains 
can easily adapt to new technical environments. 
 
Methodologically Researching Anthropotechnological Change: Towards a Practical 
Organology and a Positive Pharmacology of Cognitive Enhancement 
What does all this mean for researching and evaluating CET and their effects on the human 
cognitive system? And more generally, what does it imply for studying the process of 
anthropotechnological change that will result from, and is explicitly intended by CE, as a social 
project (for some at least even aiming toward the attainment of transhuman (trans-anthropic?) or 
posthuman (post-anthropic?) capacities)? A Stieglerian approach to this question would entail the 
development of a practical organology, allowing the methodological study of how the 
organological configurations underpinning human cognition as a process of individuation change 
as a result of the introduction within these configurations of the new technical organs represented 
by the new and emerging cognitive (and neuro-) enhancement technologies. For each such 
technology, practical organology should examine how the introduction or implementation of this 
technology in organological configurations or circuits can be expected to affect the transductive 
relationships holding between the three organ systems. It should explicate their particular organo-
logics. 
 Most crucially, since technical organs can be understood as pharmaka, each such 
technology possesses certain pharmaco-logical characteristics that should be made explicit. They 
carry a poisoning (or negative or decapacitating) as well as a curative (a positive or capacitating) 
potential, and the ultimate aim of a pharmacological analysis should be the institution of what 
Stiegler calls a positive pharmacology, i.e., a pharmacology in which the pharmakon in question is 
turned into a therapeutic device that supports the development of individual and collective 
capacities in an autonomous and creative manner and thus becomes the support of individual and 
collective practices through which the toxic, heteronomizing and proletarianizing effects of the 
technical object – its negative pharmacology – can be countered and obviated. A positive 
pharmacology would consist in the constitution of a practice or a system of care (in Greek: 
therapeia), in the form of a sociotherapy with and for the pharmakon, culminating in the 
formulation of prescriptions and norms of how to take care of and with it such that it intensifies the 
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processes of psychic and collective individuation, supports the process of socialization and 
increases autonomy and the capacity for critique and questioning. 
 Such a positive pharmacology necessarily involves the establishment of criteria for 
deciding between the ‘good’ or curative and the ‘bad’ or ‘toxifying’ effects of the pharmakon. As 
for the allegedly enhancing or improving characteristics of the various CET currently being 
proposed, from a Stieglerian perspective an important question to be asked with respect to these 
technologies as technical organs is how they affect the possibility of maintaining autonomy or 
producing new forms of autonomy for the psychic organs and the social organizations: not only for 
individual autonomy but also for collective autonomy. Reversely, we should also investigate what 
their heteronomizing and proletarianizing potentials are. 
 Like all technologies but more explicitly so, enhancement technologies affect the things 
that “a body can do,” to use Spinoza’s famous expression as quoted by Gilles Deleuze (cited in 
Deleuze 1988,  23). CET mainly affects what the psyche or the cognitive apparatus ‘can do’ (and 
the psyche or soul is what the body can do, according to Spinoza). They deliberately affect 
cognitive capacities like perception, concentration, attention, memorization, intelligence, speech 
but also reasoning, understanding, imagination and sense making. A practical organology should 
look at the effects of particular enhancement technologies on all these capacities but for lack of 
space here I shall only briefly focus on the example of attention. As a cognitive capacity, attention 
is prominently exploited within cognitive capitalism and the current ‘attention economy’ and 
therefore seems to be particularly overburdened nowadays considering the global epidemic of so-
called attention disorders that are affecting more and more swaths of the population, mainly young 
people, and which forms an increasing reason for concern worldwide. As we’ve already seen, it is 
also the capacity (also frequently referred to as concentration) that appears to be most urgently in 
need of enhancement. 
 But what would count as an enhancement of attention? And what as a disenhancement? Of 
course this depends on what kind of attention one values, or what kind of attention is valued by 
society at large. In this regard, it would be instructive to consider the politico-economic backdrop 
in which the enhancement project – as an industrial project – essentially unfolds today: that of 
cognitive or informational capitalism, to repeat this point once again. In cognitive capitalism, 
human subjects are addressed predominantly if not exclusively as both producers and consumers 
of information or of ‘semiotic goods.’ It puts the psychic organs or ‘souls’ of individuals to work, 
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as Berardi (2009a) has pointed out, and constantly solicits their attention towards consumption, as 
Stiegler emphasizes in all of his work, a consumption that largely involves the consumption of 
informational goods. Both production and consumption in cognitive capitalism means the 
processing of information by the psychic or cognitive apparatus. 
 The economic imperative behind informational, cognitive, or semiotic production and 
consumption is profit maximization, increasingly short-term profit maximization, and this drives 
the ever increasing expansion and acceleration of the semiotic or informational flows in the 
infosphere which produce the ever growing discrepancy between cyberspace and cybertime as 
Berardi evokes in his recent books. This puts ever more pressure on the ‘processing power’ of the 
cognitive apparatuses of individuals. What’s more, in cognitive capitalism cognition functions less 
and less  in a truly noetic sense as it is increasingly reduced to calculation (Stiegler 2010b, 46): the 
very identification of knowledge with information indicative of the submission of all knowledge 
to the constraints of its commodification and marketization (Stiegler 2013a, 82). Cognitive 
capitalism thrives on exploiting what Maurizio Lazzarato has called “the cooperation between 
brains” (2002, passim; see also Moulier-Boutang 2011, 53, 57, 77, 124, 140), a cooperation  
controlled – organologically – through digital networks. Cognitive and neuro-enhancement 
technologies enable the enhancement of the “attention-power” (Moulier-Boutang 2011, 118) of 
these brains, principally by adapting their attentional capacities to the attentional demands posed 
by the kinds of cognitive labor and consumption activities that the cognitariat and the consumtariat 
are summoned to engage in. 
 It should be obvious that in this techno-economic conjuncture certain modes of attention 
are systematically promoted while others tend to be systematically discouraged because they are 
less productive or less ‘efficient.’ Attention for cognitive capitalism is a resource that has to be 
exploited most efficiently. And in the competitive society set up by neoliberalism, this attention is 
under permanent competitive stress. The overall imperative of this society is that of performativity, 
as Jean-François Lyotard argued already in 1979 in The Postmodern Condition, performativity 
being the optimization of the techno-economic system in terms of efficiency and in light of the 
goals of profit maximization and the growth of power (Lyotard 1984, xxiv). That is what today’s 
decision makers impose upon individuals and the society at large. Neoliberalism, which has 
universalized the imperatives of competition and profit-maximization to all domains of life and 
thereby totalized the performance principle, demands of individuals and collectives to be 
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operational in line with the demands of performativity and to adapt unconditionally to what it calls 
‘the market.’ 
 It is clear that digital and other (e.g., neural) CET can greatly facilitate this adaptation as 
they allow for the ‘enhancement’ of the interoperability of the human cognitive system and the 
digital networks through which market imperatives are transmitted. “Informatics and biotechnical 
technologies allow bodies to connect in a continuum ruled by automatisms” (Berardi 2009a, 197). 
This interoperability, one might surmise, requires the enhancement of certain attentional capacities, 
quite likely at the cost of others that are less ‘in demand.’ Berardi, for instance, convincingly argues 
that the constant attentive stress and competitive pressure imposed upon cognitive laborers erodes 
their sensibility, i.e., their capacity for empathic understanding and pre-linguistic, non-codified 
comprehension, while increasing their sensitivity to the codes and standardized discrete signs with 
which they are continuously bombarded (2012, 125). As it is this kind of sensitivity that makes 
them more compatible with and therefore more competitive in the digital infosphere, it can be 
expected that such a capacity will most likely become a privileged target for CE, to the detriment 
of the subject’s sensibilities. This will strengthen their ‘connectivity’ to the networks yet almost 
certainly impair what Berardi calls their capacities for ‘conjunction,’ i.e., the ability to bond with 
others in irregular and unpredictable non-codified ways and to interpret non-verbal signs.13 
 For Berardi, the change from conjunction to connection, which is particularly apparent in 
what he calls the ‘connective generation’ of those born after 1980, represents nothing less than an 
anthropological shift in the sense of a deep mutation of humanity’s cognitive structures:  
 
[I]n order to make the conscious organism compatible with the connective machine, its 
cognitive system has to be reformatted. Conscious and sensitive organisms are thus 
being subjected to a process of mutation that involves the faculties of attention, 
processing, decision, and expression. Info flows have to be accelerated, and connective 
capacity has to be empowered, in order to comply with the recombinant technology of 
the global net. (Berardi 2012, 123-4) 
 
This anthropological shift has to be understood anthropotechnologically, and that is to say 
organologically and pharmacologically. As pharmaka, the CET that are currently being developed, 
primarily and most insistently with a view to better adapt the human cognitive system to cognitive 
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capitalism’s needs, can also be engaged, through adoptive, therapeutic processes of 
deproletarianizing re-appropriation and eventually re-design, to counter cognitive capitalism’s 
control of the cognitive apparatus and ultimately to overcome capital’s hold on human 
consciousness and creativity and to set the anthropological shift on more desirable and progressive 
paths. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In closing, I would like to suggest that the organological and pharmacological approach toward 
CET, especially with respect to the development of a positive pharmacology, should consider them 
explicitly in terms of technologies of the self in the way Michel Foucault (2000) has described 
them, that is to say as technical instruments for the care of self and others. And then it should both 
theorize and practice them as supports for new, desirable modes of subjectivation beyond those of 
cognitive capitalism, which favors the proletarianized knowledge-producer on the one side and the 
proletarianized consumer subject on the other. And it should reflect on the possibilities for (re-
)appropriating and (re)designing CET such that they will become the possible supports for a new 
individual and social autonomy, for new practices of freedom, for new modes of questioning and 
criticizing human existence and in general for the elevation of the collective libidinal economy, for 
what Stiegler calls an “otium of the people,” that is to say a “spiritual” culture that transcends 
negotium as the sphere of production and consumption, to which cognitive capitalism restricts 
cognition as well as research in CET (2011, 118). Only thus can these pharmaka become true 
supports for a genuine ‘enhancement’ of human ‘cognition,’ and of much more beyond just 
‘cognition.’ 
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1 NBIC stands for Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information technology and Cognitive sciences. 
2 Sandberg and Bostrom define cognitive enhancement as “the amplification or extension of core capacities of the 
mind through improvement or augmentation of internal or external information processing systems” (Sandberg and 
Bostrom 2006, 201). [Entry is missing in bibliography. Please add to reference list.] Cognitive enhancement 
technologies include neuropharmaceuticals (‘smart drugs’), neural implants, brain-computer interfaces, genetic 
engineering technologies, and deep brain stimulation. 
3 Buchanan for instance argues that many participants in the human enhancement debate share an obsolete, pre-
Darwinian view of human nature and that we should instead base our arguments on “an accurate understanding of 
evolutionary biology,” which for him is (Neo-)Darwinist (Buchanan 2011, 8). But what he does not consider for a 
moment is the fact that, as we’ll see below, evolutionary biology in the case of humans is totally different from that of 
animals, because humans – as humans - have not evolved Darwinistically but through a different, technogenic process 
of evolution. 
4 Churchland is also resolutely Darwinist in supposing that the human brain is a product of biological evolution: “We 
reason and think with our brains, but our brains are as they are – hence are cognitive faculties are as they are – because 
our brains are the products of biological evolution” (2002, 40). 
5 However, this ‘neuro-hype’ is largely based on a mythological and anything but ‘evidence-based’ belief in the 
explanatory potential of the neurosciences, as neuroscientist Felix Hasler (2012) argues in his brilliant book 
Neuromythologie, in which he shows, among many other things, that human cognition encompasses much more than 
just functioning brain tissue. 
6 Since the cognitive sciences tend to systematically neglect this, Stiegler accuses them of remaining stuck in 
metaphysics, which he defines as a forgetting of the inherently technological, i.e. accidental nature of thinking, a 
forgetting that begins with Plato’s dismissal of the role of writing as the artificial conditio sine qua non of philosophical 
thought, i.e., as the fundamental dependence of anamnesis on hypomnesis, on artificial memory supports or 
hypomnémata (Stiegler 2010a, 111-12). 
7 This means that the human is a fundamentally accidental creature, to put it paradoxically, lacking any foundation or 
origin in nature. 
8 The term ‘individuation’ comes from the French philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon, who has been very 
influential on Stiegler’s work (Stiegler 2013a, 403-5). 
9 The notions of metastability and transductivity are also derived from Simondon (Stiegler 2013a, 419). 
10 A Darwinist could invoke the so-called “Baldwin effect” to account for technological evolution. This effect, also 
known as “organic selection” or “ontogenic evolution” and first proposed by the American psychologist James Mark 
Baldwin at the end of the nineteenth century to explain apparently Lamarckian, behavior-driven evolution in animals 
within Darwinist parameters, refers to the role that behavioral (und thus phenotypic) adaptation can play in biasing and 
amplifying natural selection by enabling organisms to modify the selective environment affecting their future offspring. 
By moving into environments different from those of their ancestors, the descendants of those organisms are confronted 
with a different set of selection pressures that favor different genetic dispositions. So selection follows behavior here 
in a certain way but without violating Darwinist principles of evolution (Kirschner and Gerhardt 2005, 76-7). The 
Baldwin effect is now generally accepted even by the most ardent representatives of neo-Darwinism (Dennett 1995), 
Some evolutionary theorists of a less orthodox inclination, like Terence Deacon (1997) and Eva Jablonka and Marion 
Lamb (2006), have recruited this effect to help explain the evolution of the human mind and language. However, 
although techno-evolution in the sense of Stiegler also implies modification of the context of selection, the mechanism 
is considerably different because it involves the artificial creation of such contexts, namely in the form of technical 
milieus, and through technical exteriorization and inheritance, i.e., via artificial, non-biological evolutionary factors, 
which are totally absent in ‘Baldwinian evolution,’ since it is ultimately gene-based (i.e., supported by genetic factors). 
Moreover, in these technical milieus natural selection has given way to artificial or cultural selection in the sense of a 
process of “self-domestication” as Peter Sloterdijk has pointed out in his theories of anthropogenesis (cf. 2001, 177, 
186). Nevertheless, it is obvious that the technological ‘environments’ created by the human species through 
technology significantly bias genetic flows, thereby altering the course of evolution. And this could be interpreted, 
from a ‘Baldwinian-Darwinist’ perspective, as a form of behavior-driven evolution. In that respect, the Baldwin effect 
can certainly be said to be operative in a certain way within techno-evolution sensu Stiegler. 
11 And because of their deficient ‘nature,’ they are ‘condemned’ to constantly invent their own qualities (Stiegler 1998, 
193-4). This constitutes humanity’s destiny, which unfolds as their history. 
12 See Hayles 2007. 
13 The faculty of sensibility appears more and more as a ‘disturbing factor,’ disrupting and slackening the smooth flow 
of information exchange, “useless and even damaging in an integrated connective system. Sensibility slows down 
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processes of interpretation and renders them aleatory and ambiguous, thus reducing the competitive efficiency of the 
semiotic agent” (Berardi 2011, 41). 
